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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congressional findings underlying the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 state that child sexual abusers often use child 
pornography to “stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites.” 2  
Possession of child pornography and the act of child molestation are 
separate crimes; however, contemporary studies have highlighted a 
correlation between the principal behaviors of both.3   Recent federal 
appellate court decisions have resulted in divergent holdings, some of 
which are inconsistent with these studies.4  These decisions affect the 
federal circuit courts by blurring the threshold used to determine when 
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment is established in cases 
involving evidence of child sexual exploitation crimes.5 
The Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Colbert that evidence of 
defendant’s attempt to entice a young girl supported probable cause to 
search defendant’s home for child pornography.6  The court found that 
probable cause existed because “individuals sexually interested in 
children frequently utilize child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of 
their victims.”7  Contrary to the decision in Colbert, the Sixth Circuit 
found in United States v. Hodson that an affidavit, based on defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
 2 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub.  L. No. 104–208, § 121, 110 Stat. 
3009–26 (1996). 
 3 See Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A 
Report of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography 
Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009). 
 4 See, e.g., Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469 (2011); United 
States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577. 
 7 Id. 
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online confession to an undercover officer that he had an attraction to 
children and that he had sexually molested a seven-year-old boy, was not 
sufficient to support probable cause to search the defendant’s home for 
child pornography.8  Similarly, the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Falso held that a search for child pornography was not supported by 
probable cause where the affidavit was based, in part, on evidence that 
the defendant had previously been arrested for sexually abusing a minor.9  
Finally, and most recently, in Dougherty v. City of Covina, the Ninth 
Circuit advanced this split among the federal appellate courts by siding 
with the Second and Eighth Circuits.10  The Dougherty court held that 
although the affidavit included one allegation of attempted molestation 
of a student and multiple allegations of inappropriate touching of 
students, it did not contain any facts linking the defendant’s acts as a 
possible child molester to his possession of child pornography.11  Thus, a 
search of the defendant’s home for child pornography was not supported 
by probable cause.12 
These cases illustrate a pressing dilemma: the absence of a bright-
line rule to determine when evidence of child molestation can be used to 
support probable cause to search a defendant’s home for child 
pornography.  A vague totality of the circumstances test leads to 
probable cause being found in some instances, yet not found in many 
other similar instances.13  When probable cause cannot directly link the 
two crimes, defendants and law enforcement are faced with uncertainty 
and confusion.  This presents a compelling problem due to the inherently 
dangerous nature of the two crimes.  Conversely, adopting a bright-line 
rule that links the two crimes in the absence of direct evidence or 
sufficient probable cause may be problematic, given the United States 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to invade “legitimate expectations of 
privacy” protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.14  Grappling with and reconciling these conflicting issues is 
the underlying theme of this Comment. 
                                                                                                             
 8 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292. 
 9 Falso, 544 F.3d at 121–24. 
 10 Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 11 Id. at 898–99. 
 12 Id. at 899. 
 13 Compare United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“Standing alone, a high incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child 
pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child 
pornography.”), with United States v. Haynes, 160 F. App’x 940 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding a police officer’s belief that probable cause of child molestation supported a 
search for child pornography was objectively reasonable, based on no more than common 
sense). 
 14 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
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Law enforcement face significant obstacles in detecting child abuse 
crimes.  Two such impediments are the growing technology of the 
Internet and the ever-increasing ways that child pornographers can hide 
images.15  Traditional investigative techniques have become less useful 
at preventing the victimization of innocent children.16  Additionally, the 
crime of Internet child pornography does not coincide neatly with 
traditional Fourth Amendment precedent.  Internet child pornographers 
walk a fine line between enjoying individual liberties in the privacy of 
their home and conducting criminal activity.17  Consequently, the best 
response by the judiciary to combat the societal danger of child 
pornography has been to engage in different forms of balancing tests.18  
As evidenced by the current circuit split, an unguided judicial balancing 
test that accords inconsistent weights to different types of evidence 
regarding child sexual exploitation crimes is too subjective to serve as a 
reliable decision-making formula. 19   To determine whether probable 
cause exists to support a search for child pornography, courts, law 
enforcement, and society as a whole need a more lucid standard. 
The optimal solution is to emulate the broadened probable cause 
standard used in obtaining search warrants relating to drug crimes.20  In 
certain cases, courts loosened the probable cause standard by considering 
the background and training of the investigating affiant, the severity of 
the crime, the availability of reliable statistics, and the nexus between the 
crime and the particular place to be searched.21  If evidence of certain 
child sexual exploitation crimes may be used as evidence indicating that 
a suspect possesses child pornography, then search warrants may be 
granted on more consistent grounds.  This expanded standard will serve 
                                                                                                             
 15 Kenneth V. Lanning, Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis, National Center for 
Missing & Exploited Children, 92 (5th Ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 16 Id. 
 17 See Ellen S. Podgor, Computer Crime Facts, (2002) Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Computer_Crime.aspx (“The availability and 
dissemination of pornography is exacerbated by technology.  The accessibility of 
pornography via the Internet is a concern of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
and the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. § 2251 et. seq., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2242(b)).  These statutes and others have been added to the criminal code to provide 
additional protections to children.  When reviewing these statutes, courts have the 
difficult task of determining the appropriate line between individual liberties, such as 
privacy and free speech, and criminal conduct.”). 
 18 See supra note 4. 
 19 See supra note 4. 
 20 See United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Pace, 955 
F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1979); See discussion infra Part IV, B. 
 21 Supra note 20. 
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as a concrete guidepost for the judiciary, law enforcement personnel, and 
society, and has the potential to be used as prima facie proof that a 
questionable search is in fact reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
This Comment proceeds in three parts.  Part II details the history 
and growth of child pornography and sexual abuse of children.  This 
section describes the historical development of child pornography laws, 
as well as the historical progression of the Fourth Amendment.  Part III 
discusses the current debate on the correlation between child 
pornography and child molestation, and how this problem affects the 
federal circuit courts.  By focusing on an in-depth analysis of recent 
circuit court cases, this Comment specifically targets issues in 
developing probable cause to search for child pornography. 
Part IV identifies the ideal solution to this problem, positing that 
child pornography is a form of child abuse and, as such, a different, more 
expansive probable cause standard should be developed.  This section 
suggests a new, expanded approach to determining probable cause in 
situations involving evidence of child sexual exploitation.  Part IV also 
examines the practical ramifications of implementing the proposed 
broadened probable cause standard.  Lastly, this section argues that by 
mildly conflating evidence of child sexual exploitation crimes, the 
proposed probable cause standard will alleviate confusion and 
inconsistencies when determining whether probable cause exists. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Pornography in General 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, the first pornographic novel 
written in the English language, was published in 1748. 22  
Notwithstanding the reserved public attitude toward sex at that time, the 
novel left little to the imagination by delving into racy topics, such as 
bisexuality, voyeurism, group sex, and masochism. 23   Pornographers 
were exposed to unparalleled innovation with the advent of photography 
in 1839.24  Video followed a similar groundbreaking path.25  By 1896, 
French filmmakers were exploring pornography in short, silent films like 
Le Coucher de la Marie, which featured a strip tease.26  The cultural and 
                                                                                                             
 22 The History of Pornography No More Prudish Than the Present, FOXNEWS.COM 
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/10/13/history-pornography-
prudish-present/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter History of Pornography]. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s led to evolving social attitudes 
that cleared the way for more widespread screenings of explicit films.27  
The subsequent development of both the Internet and the digital camera 
reduced impediments to making, viewing, and distributing 
pornography. 28   Today, while pornography continues to inundate the 
Internet, the actual size of the industry remains a mystery.29 
B. Setting the Stage for Conflict: Efforts to Criminalize Child 
Pornography 
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of Freedom of Speech did not protect obscene 
material.30  In Miller v. California, the Court acknowledged that because 
there are fundamental dangers in trying to regulate any form of 
expression statutes regulating obscene materials must be narrowly 
drawn.31  In an attempt to set such limits, the Court defined obscene 
material as that which, when “taken as a whole, appeal[s] to the prurient 
interest in sex,” is patently offensive in light of community standards, 
and lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”32 
Congress’s first step toward protecting children from child 
pornography occurred with the enactment of the Federal Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in 1978.33  This legislation 
prohibited showcasing children under the age of sixteen in sexually 
explicit material to be distributed in interstate commerce, which helped 
regulate the commercial exchange of child pornography.34  Five years 
later, the Court in New York v. Ferber upheld the criminalization of the 
distribution and sale of non-obscene child pornography.35  The Court 
found that child pornography could be banned without first being 
deemed “obscene” under Miller for five reasons: (1) the government has 
a compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological 
well-being of a minor” by preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse 
of children;36 (2) child pornography distribution is intrinsically related to 
                                                                                                             
 27 The History of Pornography, supra note 22. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 31 Id. at 23–24. 
 32 Id. at 24. 
 33 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
225, § 2252(a), 92 Stat. 7, 7-8 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994)). 
 34 Amy E. Wells, Comment, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides 
with the Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 102 
(2000). 
 35 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982). 
 36 Id. 
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child sexual abuse;37 (3) commercializing child pornography provides 
economic incentive for its production;38 (4) visual depictions of children 
engaged in sexual activity have negligible artistic value; 39  and (5) 
recognizing that child pornography falls outside the protection of the 
First Amendment is compatible with Supreme Court precedent. 40  
Subsequently, in 1984, Congress passed the Child Protection Act, 41 
which increased the legal age of a minor to eighteen and abolished the 
commercial transaction requirement. 42   Finally, due to emerging 
technologies, in 1988 Congress passed the Child Protection and 
Obscenity Enforcement Act,43 which prohibited the distribution of child 
pornography by means of computers.44 
Following these important legislative actions, the Supreme Court, 
in 1990, extended its holding in Ferber and upheld state criminal 
sanctions for the private possession of child pornography. 45   By 
outlawing such possession, the government sought to eliminate genuine 
harm to children by diminishing the market for child pornography.46  In 
response to the growth of the Internet and other innovative and evolving 
technologies, Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996 (CPPA).47  The CPPA’s focus was on restricting child pornography 
on the Internet, including virtual child pornography.48  The Ninth Circuit 
stated that child pornography regulation altered from defining the crime 
“in terms of the harm inflicted upon real children to a determination that 
child pornography was evil in and of itself, whether it involved real 
children or not.”49 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. at 759. 
 38 Id. at 761. 
 39 Id. at 762. 
 40 Id. at 763. 
 41 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 42 Wade T. Anderson, Criminalizing “Virtual” Child Pornography Under the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act: Is It Really What It “Appears to Be?” 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 
393, 396 (2001). 
 43 Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A-
2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
 44 Anderson, supra note 42, at 397. 
 45 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 46 Id. at 141–43. 
 47 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110 
Stat. 3009–26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV 1998)); see also Anderson, supra 
note 42, at 403. 
 48 Anderson, supra note 42, at 403–04; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999). 
 49 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 
sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001). 
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Recent legislative and judicial responses to the proliferation of 
child pornography have been strict.50  Criminal penalties for possessing 
child pornography have also increased considerably.51  The underlying 
dialogue pushing for increased sentences suggests that there is a 
negligible difference between those who possess child pornography and 
those who actually molest children.52  A fundamental thread throughout 
this discourse is that regardless of the differences in penalties for child 
pornography and child molestation, these two crimes are highly 
intertwined based on the inherent danger both crimes present to innocent 
children.53  Finally, advancing forms of technology make it easier for 
child pornographers to avoid detection.54  Law enforcement personnel 
face a formidable challenge when this opportunity for secrecy intersects 
with individual liberties, such as privacy, which are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.  This issue can be resolved by mildly conflating the 
crimes of child molestation and child pornography.  By doing so, the 
ability to establish probable cause would be slightly expanded without 
infringing on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
C. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects a citizen from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.55  It reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.56 
Over the course of the past century, the United States saw a major 
evolution of the Fourth Amendment and, more specifically, the probable 
cause standard.  The overarching theme of the Fourth Amendment 
requires that a neutral magistrate be the one to draw evidentiary 
inferences as opposed to a police officer “engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime.”57  Beginning in 1933, the 
Court announced that mere suspicion is not enough to support probable 
                                                                                                             
 50 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 855 (2011) (discussing the rhetoric surrounding the link 
between the crimes of child pornography and child sexual abuse). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 854. 
 55 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
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cause to obtain a warrant to search a private dwelling.58  The Court 
required greater proof to protect individuals from overzealous law 
enforcement agents entering a home without sufficient probable cause.59 
In Illinois v. Gates, the Court stated that reviewing magistrates are 
tasked with the responsibility of making “a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . 
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.”60  Supreme Court precedent establishes that 
the probable cause standard is not rigid.  Rather, probable cause is an 
imprecise concept that focuses on the realities “of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.”61  Because the 
probable cause standard is fluid and nebulous, it can lead to a multitude 
of problems in trying to obtain a search warrant.62  Inconsistency and 
uncertainty abound when a law enforcement agent can submit an 
affidavit to one magistrate judge and obtain a search warrant, yet be 
denied a search warrant by a different magistrate judge evaluating the 
same affidavit. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Intersection of Child Molestation and Child Pornography 
A legal debate exists as to whether there is simply a correlation 
between child molestation and child pornography or whether there is 
actual causation between the two crimes. 63   This Comment seeks to 
determine whether this debate is meaningless; even without evidence 
supporting causation, if these two crimes are so highly correlated that 
they are almost one and the same, should not evidence of one support 
probable cause to locate evidence of the other?  The Department of 
Justice has suggested that, “[s]etting aside whether there is a causal 
connection or even a correlation between child pornography and child 
                                                                                                             
 58 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933). 
 59 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14. 
 60 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 61 Id. at 241 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). 
 62 Compare Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasonably approving a search 
of defendant’s home in order to locate child pornography when there was evidence the 
defendant attempted to entice a young girl), with Falso, 544 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(holding search for child pornography was not supported by probable cause where the 
affidavit was based in part on evidence that defendant had previously been arrested for 
sexually abusing a minor). 
 63 Alexandra Gelber, Response to “A Reluctant Rebellion,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 6 
(2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2010/
009c_Reluctant_Rebellion_Response.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
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molestation, those who collect child pornography exploit and victimize 
the children in those images, and create a demand for the production of 
more child pornography . . . .”64 
Further, a study conducted by Michael L. Bourke, of the United 
States Marshals Service, and Andres E. Hernandez, of the Federal 
Correction Institution located in Butner, North Carolina, gathered further 
empirical evidence of the debate over the link between these two 
categories of crime.65  The study analyzed two types of offenders: child 
pornographers with no known “hands-on” sexual abuse history and child 
pornographers known to have sexually abused at least one child victim.66  
The objective of the study was to determine the likelihood of a child 
pornographer engaging in child molestation.67  This was accomplished 
by investigating what percentage of child pornographers were also 
undetected child sexual abusers.68 
The study’s findings revealed that the child pornographers were 
“significantly more likely than not to have sexually abused a child.”69  
This study also reported a 2,369% increase in the number of sexual abuse 
offenses admitted by the subjects from the time of their sentencing to the 
time of the study.70  This staggering percentage challenges the notion that 
child pornographers only involve themselves with pictures and images of 
children.71  Of the subjects who entered treatment with no known history 
of sexual abuse offenses, less than two percent actually turned out to be 
strictly child pornographers.72 
The Butner Study calls into question whether it is realistic or useful 
to distinguish child pornographers and child abusers.73  The authors of 
the study believe that an intricate, shared relationship between these two 
crimes exists.74  Further, the results of the study suggest that our society 
may be faced with a new category of offenders: child pornographers 
“may be undetected child molesters and . . . their use of child 
pornography is indicative of their paraphilic orientation.”75 
                                                                                                             
 64 Id.; see also Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J. (2009), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_reluctant_rebellion/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2012). 
 65 Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 3. 
 66 Id. at 183. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. (emphasis added). 
 70 Id. at 188. 
 71 Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 3, at 188. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 189. 
 75 Id. at 190. 
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B. How This Problem Affects the Federal Circuits 
Three leading cases sought to determine whether evidence of child 
molestation could support probable cause to obtain a search warrant to 
locate child pornography.76  They were all decided upon wholly different 
factual foundations.77  Nevertheless, there is a common theme throughout 
all three cases: each federal appellate court attempted to delicately 
balance the critical need to protect innocent minors against the revered 
privacy rights of the accused. 78   The uncertainty of this imprecise 
balancing test creates confusion among the circuit courts, of which 
clarity is desperately needed. 
1. United States v. Colbert – Eighth Circuit 
In United States v. Colbert,79 detectives investigated a complaint of 
suspicious activity at a park when a young girl’s uncle witnessed an older 
man speaking with his niece and became concerned.80  A description of 
the man’s vehicle was relayed to the police who conducted a traffic stop 
of the defendant.81  The defendant consented to a search of his car and 
detectives discovered a police scanner, handcuffs, and a “New York PD” 
hat.82  To explain these possessions, the defendant stated that he had 
previously worked as a security guard.83  He then admitted that he had 
been talking to the young girl at the park about movies that he had at his 
apartment.84 
Subsequently, a search warrant affidavit was prepared to search the 
defendant’s residence for evidence of child pornography.85  All of the 
facts relating to the incident in the park, as well as the detectives’ 
interaction with the defendant were summarized in the warrant 
application.86  A search warrant for the apartment was granted by the 
magistrate and a search located children’s movies, a computer, and 
numerous compact discs containing child pornography. 87   The 
                                                                                                             
 76 See cases cited supra note 4. 
 77 See cases cited supra note 4. 
 78 See cases cited supra note 4. 
 79 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469 (2011). 
 80 Id. at 575. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 575. 
 86 Id. at 575–76. 
 87 Id. at 576. 
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defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his home was 
denied and he subsequently appealed.88 
The district court addressed whether the facts set forth in the 
affidavit, detailing the alleged enticement of a young girl, established a 
link supporting probable cause to search the defendant’s home to locate 
child pornography.89  The court determined that the affidavit did in fact 
establish probable cause to search the home for child pornography 
because “individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize 
child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of their victims.”90  More 
specifically, the court asserted that child pornography was logically 
related to child enticement, particularly when a defendant had 
specifically referred to movies and videos that he wanted the child to 
view.91 
The district court found that the reviewing magistrate reasonably 
concluded the search of Colbert’s home was justified, notwithstanding 
the affidavit’s lack of detail.92  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed this holding, rationalizing that an intuitive relationship exists 
between child molestation or enticement and possession of child 
pornography. 93   The circuit court explained that child pornography 
possession is a logical precursor to child molestation and that this 
relationship is worsened due to the ubiquitous nature of child 
pornography on the Internet. 94   The easy access to Internet child 
pornography creates a discrete way for child molesters to secretly satisfy 
their pedophilic desires.95 
The dissenting opinion was concerned about the majority’s reliance 
on what it called a “dangerous assumption” in affirming the validity of 
the search warrant. 96   The dissent believed that the affidavit strictly 
supported probable cause regarding child enticement and not possession 
of child pornography.97  The dissent also noted the magistrate judge’s 
deduction of a nexus between child enticement and child pornography, 
without additional evidence supporting that inference, was 
                                                                                                             
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 576–77. 
 90 Id. at 577. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 577–78. 
 94 Id. at 578. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 579 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id. at 580. 
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unreasonable.98  The dissent primarily relied on two cases: United States 
v. Hodson99 and United States v. Falso.100 
2. United States v. Hodson – Sixth Circuit 
On October 7, 2005, a police detective conducted a search for 
online sexual predators by signing on to the Internet under the alias 
“kidlatino12” and pretending to be a twelve year-old boy. 101   The 
detective encountered another user under the alias “WhopperDaddy” 
who confided to the detective that he was a forty-one year-old married 
father of two sons.102  “WhopperDaddy” also confessed that he was a 
homosexual with a preference for young boys, that he enjoyed seeing his 
sons naked, and that he had sex with his seven year-old nephew.103  Next, 
“WhopperDaddy” told the twelve-year-old male alias that he was 
interested in performing oral sex on him.104  America Online (“AOL”) 
identification records revealed that the ‘WhopperDaddy’ screen name 
was registered to Michael Hodson.105 
It was subsequently discovered that Hodson was the father of only 
one son and had no nephews. 106   An affidavit to search Hodson’s 
residence was prepared based on the AOL identification information and 
the Internet conversation. 107   The affidavit requested a search for 
evidence of child pornography; however, the statement of probable cause 
failed to allege any involvement by the defendant in child pornography 
other than the Internet communications. 108   Likewise, there was no 
evidence supporting the notion that child molesters are also likely to 
possess child pornography.109  Nonetheless, a warrant was issued and 
Hodson’s residence was searched by law enforcement.110  Police located 
numerous pictures of child pornography buried in the hard drives of 
Hodson’s computer, but did not discover or seize any evidence to support 
a charge of child molestation against Hodson.111 
                                                                                                             
 98 Id. at 580–81 (citing Hodson, 543 F.3d at 293 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 99 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 100 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 101 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287. 
 108 Id. at 288–289. 
 109 Id. at 289. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
206 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:30 
Hodson was indicted for receiving and possessing child 
pornography and subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized during the search.112  The reviewing magistrate judge focused on 
the “molestation-pornography nexus,” and concluded there was a lack of 
evidence linking Hodson to child pornography. 113   The magistrate 
determined there was a weak inference that Hodson viewed child 
pornography solely based on the fact that he allegedly enjoyed seeing his 
children unclothed.114  The magistrate judge declared that to infer that 
Hodson possessed child pornography would require an assumption that 
suspected child molesters always possess child pornography.115 
The magistrate declined to make that assumption because he was 
not persuaded that Hodson possessed child pornography based solely on 
evidence that he was an alleged child molester.116  The magistrate judge 
was influenced by dicta in United States v. Adkins117 in concluding that 
the online conversation, although repugnant, did not create a link 
between child molestation and pornography possession. 118   The 
magistrate added, however, that had the detective included her expertise 
on the nexus between the two crimes in the affidavit, such an empirical 
link might have been reached.119 
With regard to the government’s argument that the officer’s 
reliance on the search warrant was made in good faith, the magistrate 
found that while the detective’s failure to provide evidence supporting 
the critical link undercut the warrant, it was not made in bad faith.120  
Further, the magistrate held that the validity of the warrant was not 
completely destroyed by the lack of a nexus between the two crimes 
because both the conduct described and the evidence sought involved 
sexual exploitation of minors.121 
The district court conducted a hearing based on both parties’ 
objections to the magistrate’s findings.122  Because the detective did not 
include the necessary expertise to establish a link between child 
molestation and child pornography possession, the district court found 
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the warrant defective for lack of probable cause. 123   Next, the court 
applied the Leon good faith exception and concluded that the affidavit 
contained information demonstrating that the defendant was engaged in 
child molestation and illicit online activity.124  Both of these activities 
involve sexual exploitation of minors and, as such, are closely linked to 
possession of child pornography.125  Therefore, the district court denied 
the motion to suppress and Hodson subsequently appealed.126 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Adkins 
concluded that it was unreasonable for the magistrate judge to infer the 
nexus between child pornography and child molestation without 
additional evidence.127  Further, the court of appeals, unlike the district 
court, did not adhere to the Leon good faith exception, stating that it was 
also unreasonable for the police officer to infer the nexus herself or to 
rely on her own subjective knowledge of the nexus between the two 
crimes.128  Thus, the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress was 
reversed, Hodson’s conviction was vacated, and the case was 
remanded.129 
3. United States v. Falso – Second Circuit 
United States v. Falso130  is yet another circuit court case that blurs 
the probable cause standard in relation to child molestation and child 
pornography. The defendant moved to suppress evidence of child 
pornography seized from his home on the grounds that probable cause 
for the search did not exist.131   The lower court denied this motion, 
finding that probable cause existed and that the “good-faith” exception 
applied.132  The issue presented on appeal was whether the lower court’s 
finding of probable cause existed when it was based on a search warrant 
stating that the defendant may have attempted to gain access to a child 
pornography website.133  The search warrant affidavit also noted that the 
defendant had an eighteen year-old conviction for sexual abuse of a 
minor.134  The Second Circuit found that although the defendant did try 
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to gain access to the child pornography website, he was not a registered 
member of the site. 135   Therefore, the question on appeal hinged on 
whether the defendant’s eighteen year-old conviction for sexual abuse of 
a minor could support a belief that evidence of child pornography would 
be found in his home.136  The court held that probable cause was lacking, 
but that the good-faith exception applied.137 
In evaluating whether the affidavit supported probable cause in this 
case, the Second Circuit first looked to the illustrated nexus between 
child pornography and child molestation.138  The Second Circuit believed 
that the line of reasoning asserted in the affidavit, that the majority of 
child pornography possessors are persons who are sexually attracted to 
children, was illogical.139  Relying on the dissenting opinion in United 
States v. Martin140 the court concluded that “it is an inferential fallacy of 
ancient standing to conclude that, because members of group A (those 
who collect child pornography) are likely to be members of group B 
(those attracted to children), then group B is entirely, or even largely 
composed of, members of group A.”141  Thus, the court held that even 
though the lower court was understandably concerned with public safety, 
an individual’s Fourth Amendment right cannot be destroyed because of 
illogical inferences drawn from unsupported facts.142 
The court then discussed whether the defendant’s prior sex-crime 
conviction was relevant to the probable cause analysis.143  The court 
determined that because there was no evidence of ongoing impropriety, 
the temporal gap was not bridged between the eighteen year-old 
conviction and the current alleged child pornography offense.144  Further, 
the court stated, although the prior conviction involved the sexual abuse 
of a minor, it was not a conviction for possession of child 
pornography.145  The court demanded that it is not enough that the law 
criminalizes both of the aforementioned crimes; the two misconducts are 
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separate crimes. 146   Because the search warrant did not provide the 
needed correlation between a person’s inclinations to commit both types 
of crimes, the Second Circuit found that probable cause did not exist.147 
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTION 
A. Expanded Probable Cause Standard Limited to Child Sexual 
Exploitation Situations 
In order to resolve the disagreement among the federal circuit 
courts on this issue, the Supreme Court should develop an expanded 
probable cause standard limited to child sexual exploitation situations 
when certain requirements are met.  This type of expansion would not be 
novel, as it is already used consistently and analogously in cases where 
law enforcement seek to find evidence in the home of an individual 
suspected of association with drugs.148  Therefore, because of the severity 
of crimes dealing with child endangerment, an expanded probable cause 
standard, allowing evidence of certain child sexual exploitation crimes to 
support probable cause for a search for child pornography, is warranted 
by societal norms. 
B. Existing Judicial Precedent of Probable Cause Standard as a 
Foundation 
The analysis of this new standard should not be undertaken without 
context and reviewing magistrates should continue to take into account 
judicial precedent when determining whether the probable cause standard 
has been met.  One important aspect that cannot be overlooked is the 
notion, developed in Johnson v. United States, 149  that evidentiary 
inferences should be drawn by a “neutral and detached magistrate,” as 
opposed to a law enforcement “officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”150  This requirement does not deny law 
enforcement the benefit of reasonable inferences; it simply places that 
control in the hands of an impartial magistrate as opposed to a potentially 
zealous police officer.151 
Additionally, magistrates should continue to abide by the “totality 
of the circumstances” approach developed in Gates to determine when 
                                                                                                             
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 124. 
 148 See supra note 20; see discussion infra Part IV, B. 
 149 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
 150 Id. at 14. 
 151 Id. at 13–14. 
210 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:30 
probable cause exists.152  By rejecting the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli153 two-
pronged test, the Supreme Court in Gates adopted an all-encompassing 
“totality of the circumstances” standard.154  The standard states that the 
issuing magistrate’s task is to “make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.”155  The Supreme Court hoped that this flexible and 
functional standard would better achieve the equilibrium of “public and 
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires.”156 
C. Analogous Situations of an Expansion of the Probable Cause 
Standard 
There are many examples of situations in which courts allow a 
loose interpretation of the probable cause standard in evaluating 
affidavits related to crimes involving drugs. 157   The Sixth Circuit 
declared that depending on the crime being investigated, evidence 
sought, and the opportunity for concealment of evidence, a magistrate 
judge may deduce a link between a suspect and a location to be 
searched.158  Many circuits have also held that judges may infer that 
suspected criminals are likely to retain evidence of their crimes in their 
homes.159 
An example of this loosened probable cause interpretation is 
evident in United States v. Pace, where police officers observed 
marijuana plants growing inside a barn located on the defendant Pace’s 
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property.160  Based on the information obtained from a legal search of the 
barn, additional warrants were issued for Pace’s residences. 161   The 
search warrant affidavit stated that people who grow marijuana often 
keep contraband, proceeds, and records hidden in their homes to prevent 
police detection.162  Subsequent searches of the residences revealed a 
plethora of documents relating to drug transactions, as well as certain 
drug paraphernalia, including marijuana and cash. 163   Pace was 
subsequently indicted for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to 
distribute.164 
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the holding of United States v. 
Freeman, 165  which stated, that search warrant affidavits must contain 
facts establishing a “nexus between the house to be searched and the 
evidence sought.”166  The court expounded that while the affidavit must 
link the location to be searched with the alleged illegal activity, the 
connection could be founded on ordinary “inferences as to where the 
sought out evidence would normally be located.”167  The Pace court 
concluded that probable cause was supported to search the defendant’s 
home based on the fact that a link was established between the illegal 
activity and the belief that certain evidence would be located at the 
defendant’s home.168  This case illustrates the importance of expressly 
explaining and clearly delineating the connection between the specific, 
alleged criminal activity and the likelihood of locating evidence of a 
separate criminal activity in a particular location. 
United States v. Feliz 169  presents another analogous situation in 
which a court employed an expanded probable cause standard to find a 
nexus between alleged criminal activity and evidence to be found at the 
particular location.  In Feliz, officers submitted an affidavit containing 
detailed information demonstrating that the defendant was involved in 
illegal drug trafficking.170  The defendant argued that the drug sales did 
not occur at or near his apartment and moreover, that the police officer’s 
extensive experience in drug trafficking activity was inadequate to 
supply the required nexus to support probable cause.171  The First Circuit 
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Court of Appeals disagreed with this contention.172  The court stated that 
by analyzing an affidavit using a commonsense and realistic approach, 
probable cause could be inferred that criminal objects may be located in 
a particular place even when not linked by direct evidence. 173  
Ultimately, the court held that it was reasonable for the judge to rely on 
her commonsense, along with the affiant’s professional law enforcement 
opinion, to determine that it was likely that defendant would have 
evidence of drug trafficking transactions at his home.174 
Last, in United States v. Nance, 175 a suspect purchased drugs from 
an undercover police officer.  After he was arrested, a search warrant was 
obtained to search his home for drug paraphernalia, money, and 
weapons.176  Firearms were indeed located in the defendant’s home.177  
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence claiming that it 
was illegally seized based on lack of probable cause. 178   While the 
underlying affidavit contained information wholly regarding defendant’s 
criminal drug activity, the final sentence added that based on the law 
enforcement officer’s professional experience and opinion, drug dealers 
keep weapons in their homes.179  Based on this, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the affidavit established probable cause to support the warrant.180 
The preceding cases demonstrate that courts have loosely 
interpreted the probable cause standard in certain situations relating to 
drug crimes.  The magistrates involved issued warrants to locate 
evidence of a crime without any direct proof that the evidence would be 
located in the defendants’ homes.  Subjective testimony from law 
enforcement officials based on their experience and training, as well as, 
common sense inferences made by the neutral and detached magistrates 
allowed for these search warrants to be approved.181  If the probable 
cause standard can be broadened to account for these specific drug 
related crimes, it should also be broadened for inherently dangerous 
crimes involving child sexual exploitation. 
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D. The Uniqueness of Child Pornography Offenders and Why the 
Probable Cause Standard Should be Broadened in Relation to 
Child Sexual Exploitation Crimes 
The effect of sweeping technological advances on modern 
American society has forced the law to adapt.182  It is imperative that 
criminal laws also evolve to maintain pace with progressing 
technology.183  While the child pornography industry is not new, the 
emergence of the Internet and advancements in computer technology 
have transformed it into a global industry.184   The anonymity of the 
Internet only exacerbates the problem of child pornography.185  On one 
hand, law enforcement officials’ success in locating and arresting child 
pornographers depends on their ability to remain informed of innovative 
technological advances.186  On the other hand, legislative and judicial 
decisions also tend to dictate the efficacy of law enforcement officials in 
apprehending and prosecuting possessors of Internet child 
pornography.187  Thus, all three branches of government must take great 
efforts to ensure the equilibrium between sacred individual privacy 
interests and concerns surrounding dangerous crimes of sexual 
exploitation and abuse of innocent children. 
Typically, defendants who engage in child pornography present a 
complex and unique barrier to law enforcement discovery.  Child 
pornographers go to great lengths to hide their crimes, thereby making 
detection of child pornography immensely difficult.188  Often, it is not 
until after an individual is arrested for the more severe crime of child 
                                                                                                             
 182 Amy E. Wells, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the 
Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 99 (2000); see 
generally Randolph S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and 
Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181 (1995) (focusing on how “the development of modern 
communications technology forces [society] . . . to [reestablish] the balance between 
individual privacy and society’s need for information”). 
 183 Wells, 53 OKLA. L. REV. at 100. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 101 (citing Jennifer Stewart, If This Is the Global Community, We Must Be 
on the Bad Side of Town: International Policing of Child Pornography on the Internet, 
20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 205, 215 (1997) (“A person can establish a bulletin board, and use it 
to exchange sexual interests in children, without a license or registration.”) and John R. 
Levine et al., The Internet for Dummies, 218, 225 (5th ed. 1998) (“A person can reroute 
e-mail and graphic images through multiple nations so that the origin of the file is 
virtually undetectable.”)) 
 186 Wells, 53 OKLA. L. REV. at 107. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Dr. Tory J. Caeti, Ph.D., Sex Crimes, Part I: Child Pornography, 18, Law 
Enforcement Training Network (2009), available at 
http://www.twlk.com/law/tests/letn1640102ct.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
214 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:30 
sexual abuse, that possession of child pornography is discovered.189  In 
this way, law enforcement efforts are reactive as opposed to proactive 
about responding to this evolving social crisis. 
The judiciary’s willingness to adopt a broadened probable cause 
standard in drug-related crimes might be a result of the amorphous “War 
on Drugs” and law enforcement efforts to reduce the illegal drug trade.190  
While reducing and eliminating the illegal drug trade is of great 
importance, there is no reason why its expanded probable cause standard 
cannot be extended to crimes involving child sexual exploitation.  The 
historical development of child pornography laws demonstrates that 
mainstream society consider crimes involving child sexual exploitation 
to be abhorrent and dangerous. 191   Moreover, the most unique 
characteristic of child molesters is their gripping interest in child 
pornography. 192   Thus, for many child molesters, child pornography 
serves as a facilitator to commit child molestation.193 
The two competing interests in this debate are: the sanctity of the 
individual’s privacy in the home versus the overwhelming concern for 
the protection of children.  This is an arduous balancing act due to the 
high value United States citizens place on individualized privacy 
interests; the privacy of one’s home is considered sacrosanct. 194   In 
considering these two competing interests, the judiciary’s decisions 
should favor protecting children.  Child pornography presents a severe 
threat to children, who are inherently incapable of protecting themselves. 
This proposed expanded probable cause standard would not provide 
carte blanche freedom to law enforcement officials in obtaining search 
warrants.  Affidavits must include specific, detailed criteria, such as: (1) 
a clear history, including examples, of training and experience of the 
affiant in establishing and determining probable cause; (2) a detailed 
description of reliable statistical data reflecting the strong correlation 
between specific child sexual exploitation crimes; and (3) a clear, 
delineated nexus between the first two elements and the particular place 
to be searched.  The inclusion of these specific details combined with a 
common sense, practical application by a neutral and detached magistrate 
will provide sufficient probable cause to search for child pornography in 
an individual’s home with or without direct evidence. 
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E. Practical Ramifications of Implementing a Broadened Probable 
Cause Standard 
Implementing this broadened standard has the potential to create 
more efficiency within the law enforcement arena, as well as, provide a 
more manageable standard to combat a highly secretive and extremely 
dangerous crime.  Because of the exceptionally high level of danger child 
molesters and child pornographers pose to our society, this expansion is 
appropriate.  Courts are not unaccustomed to altering and expanding the 
probable cause standard.  For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme 
Court denounced the suggestion of a “rigid, all-or-nothing model of 
justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment.”195 
The Terry court declared that there is no clear definition for what 
constitutes a reasonable search, but rather that the need for the search 
must be weighed against the invasion of the search.196  In order to justify 
the imposition, law enforcement must have precise and articulable facts 
to reasonably warrant the intrusion.197  The Court stated that an inflexible 
approach “obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope . . . of police 
action as a means of constitutional regulation.” 198   Thus, Terry 
announced a new standard allowing “a reasonable search for weapons for 
the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he 
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether 
he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”199  The Court 
focused on the notion that law enforcement officers are entitled to draw 
specific, reasonable inferences from certain facts in light of their 
experiences. 200   The “reasonableness” concept pronounced in Terry 
supports a mild expansion of the probable cause standard in narrow 
circumstances involving child sexual exploitation. 
In contrast, the potential danger of this broadened approach is that it 
could open the floodgates to similar treatment of other crimes.  Giving 
certain crimes more weight based on the societal interest in preventing 
that crime could result in a weakening of the safeguards envisioned by 
the framers of the Fourth Amendment.  This issue could be exacerbated 
if the respective weights are determined by over-zealous, though perhaps 
well-intentioned, police officers instead of a neutral and detached 
magistrate judge.  Nevertheless, if the expanded probable cause standard 
is safeguarded in harmony with the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to 
                                                                                                             
 195 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 28. 
 200 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
216 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 9:30 
intrude upon constitutionally guaranteed rights, then a limited expansion 
for inherently dangerous child sexual exploitation crimes is warranted. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While it remains true that child molestation and child pornography 
are two separate crimes, and that the seriousness of one crime should 
never be primarily based on evidence of the other, there is overwhelming 
evidence that these two types of crimes are strongly correlated.  One 
detective in the Los Angeles, California police department estimated that 
more than half of the roughly 700 child molesters he had arrested 
possessed child pornography at the time of arrest.201  Additionally, then-
Senator Joe Biden stated during a congressional hearing that the heart of 
this discussion boils down to a very candid notion: children used in the 
production of child pornography are sexual abuse victims at the hands of 
the pornographers.202  Further, the growing capabilities of the Internet 
and the novel ways that child pornography possessors can hide images 
and deceive law enforcement creates an impossibly difficult issue; 
traditional investigative techniques are becoming less useful in 
preventing the victimization of innocent children. 
Thus, while child pornographers do not fit precisely into any 
existing, traditional Fourth Amendment category, a response by the 
judiciary in formulating a broadened probable cause standard in order to 
search for child pornography is the United States’ best attempt at 
combating the societal danger created by this type of crime.  The 
expanded probable cause standard is by no means attempting to 
unconstitutionally interfere with sexual activity between two consenting 
adults in the privacy of their own home. 203   On the contrary, this 
expanded standard applies to a unique area of law where society has 
clearly drawn special, protective boundaries in order to safeguard 
innocent child victims.  While this modest expansion of the probable 
cause standard may appear to conflict with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court constantly attempts to strike a balance 
between compelling government interests and individual privacy 
rights.204  Inevitably, with every valid search based on probable cause, 
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there is the possibility of a slight invasion of privacy; however, in order 
to combat inherently dangerous crimes involving child sexual 
exploitation, this limited expansion is the fair and just result.  By 
emulating the existing expansion of the probable cause standard for drug-
related crimes, the judiciary can create an efficient and more uniform 
conception of determining probable cause for crimes relating to child 
sexual exploitation. 
 

